Why have deliberations over World Heritage sites become such a volatile arena for the performance of international tensions, new political alliances and challenges to global cooperation? Across UN platforms, the failures of multilateralism are increasingly evident. We suggest that decision-making within the World Heritage Committee is no different given that politicisation is now rife throughout their deliberations. Specifically we ask how have multipolarity and fragmentation developed within United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation's (UNESCO) World Heritage programme, an organisation dedicated to peace building, tolerance and mutual understanding and international co-operation? This paper examines trends from the last decade of UNESCO's World Heritage Committee meetings, specifically the nominations of properties for inscription on the World Heritage List. Our findings suggest that the recommendations presented by UNESCO's Advisory Bodies are increasingly at odds with the final decisions adopted by the World Heritage Committee. The process by which evaluations are formulated by these experts is also being questioned, opening up larger debates about the validity and transparency of the evaluation criteria and process. We go on to outline the regional and geopolitical trends at work in the Committee and to question whether site inscription is affected by a State Party's presence on the Committee. While once considered the realm of European States Parties and their particular style of properties, our analysis reveals that the demographics of the Committee in the last decade have gradually shifted. Finally, this leads us to question whether the older style polarisation of 'the West and the Rest' remains the most salient divide today.
UNESCO's World Heritage Program
In 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was created with a constitution mandating 'the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science'. Soon after, this commitment transformed into proactive international assistance: the first mission was launched in 1959 for the Nubian monuments of Egypt, which were threatened by the construction of the Aswan Dam. In 1965, the idea of a World Heritage Trust was first proposed during the White House Conference in the US and the term 'world heritage' was coined (Bandarin 2007; Allais 2013, 7) . In 1972, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO 1972) . It established a new provision for the international and collective protection of heritage with 'outstanding universal value' (see Titchen 1996; Jokilehto and Cameron 2008; Labadi 2013) .
1 While there were originally only a handful of nations at the time of ratification, today there are 191 signatories. The Convention created a set of obligations to protect the past for future generations, an aspiration for a shared sense of belonging and a global solidarity (Choay 2001, 140) .
The World Heritage Centre (WHC) was established in 1992 to act as the Secretariat and coordinator within UNESCO for all matters related to the Convention. The Centre organises the annual sessions of the World Heritage Committee (the Committee) and provides advice to States Parties in the preparation of site nominations. The WHC along with the Advisory Bodies also organises international assistance from the World Heritage Fund and coordinates both the reporting on the condition of sites and the emergency action undertaken when a site is threatened.
The Advisory Bodies are comprised of international experts who conduct monitoring missions and evaluations: the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) . 2 For example, individual evaluators from ICOMOS might include archaeologists, structural engineers or mud-brick conservators, each with their own disciplinary, national and personal priorities and attachments (Turtinen 2000; Lafrenz Samuels 2009 ). ICOMOS and the IUCN communicate their findings in lengthy reports and presentations at international meetings, although their technical approaches and priorities are being increasingly challenged. Recently, ICOMOS has been subject to extensive criticism from States Parties, especially those from nonWestern nations (Claudi 2011, 36) , ranging from their factual errors to Eurocentric bias (see Rico 2008; Meskell 2012 Meskell , 2013b . Unlike the IUCN that has partnerships and donors, ICOMOS relies heavily on UNESCO's contributions 3 and has subsequently faced a funding crisis of late. Their lack of funding is a major and permanent problem in the World Heritage system, and even more so for ICOMOS, whose voluntary real and in-kind contributions to the World Heritage process for 2012 totaled more than €500,000, an amount that is unsustainable. (ICOMOS 2012, 11) As an intergovernmental agency and part of the UN family, States Parties that are signatories to the Convention are in fact the most powerful decision-makers in World Heritage (Askew 2010; Meskell 2013b) (Wright 1998; Bendix 2013; Müller 2013 ) and political negotiations, especially within UNESCO (Schmitt 2012; Brumann 2014) , we are interested in how organisations such as UNESCO have global impacts, albeit in often unexpected and unpredictable ways that are not always revealed in official agendas. Following Müller (2013, 10) , when anthropologists study the actions of individuals and states within international agencies, these bodies appear at the same time more active, contradictory and perhaps even less 'rational'. Yet if researches rely solely on the documents, substantive political issues are often masked as technical ones, thus 'being there' to track the complex machinations is essential.
On the quantitative side, we collected and organised information from the Summary Records and other World Heritage Committee official documents for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . For each nomination, we tracked the Advisory Bodies' recommendation, the final decision by the World Heritage Committee, the number of delegates and each intervention by State Parties during the sessions. Only a few studies have adopted a quantitative approach to investigate patterns in the selection of properties for inscription on the World Heritage List. Frey, Pamini, and Steiner (2013) and Reyes (2014) use the number of World Heritage sites per country to explain the determinants of the imbalance in the List. At a more detailed level, studies by Bertacchini and Saccone (2012) and Reyes use both site nominations and final inscriptions to analyse the nomination activity by countries and the factors affecting the probability of inscription. The data presented in this paper focuses on a shorter period of analysis (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , but it provides more detailed information on the procedural and substantive aspects of the decision-making process, namely how Advisory Body recommendations and States Parties' actions in the World Heritage Committee interact in the final selection of sites. We argue that this methodology provides a more effective approach to highlight the tensions emerging in the World Heritage decision-making process.
Auditing cultures UNESCO regularly commissions internal reports and audits, as do other agencies and national delegations on the World Heritage programme and since 2010, there have been some startling findings. A Norwegian report to the 34th session of the Committee (2010) found that over the previous 10-15 years, an increasing politicisation has developed whereby policy has trumped technical expertise. Reporting on the meeting in Brasilia, The Economist (2010) signalled that 'the UN agency (was) bending its own rules under pressure from member states'. During the General Assembly of the State Parties to the World Heritage Convention in 2009, half the exiting Committee was replaced by new delegations. Some of our informants, including senior officials and delegates, attribute the changed dynamics in the Committee to this moment and so, we conduct our analyses both before and after this new geo-political configuration of the Committee. Our findings in terms of the frequency of interventions during the meetings show that Brazil, China and Egypt are the most vocal nations. France, Switzerland, Mali, Barbados and South Africa closely followed in the number of times they took the floor.
Moreover, the Norwegian report claimed (2010, 3) that China had put pressure on other members to secure their own nominated sites for inscription before formal Committee discussions, with several State Parties expressing concern. Brazil, as host nation and chair of the Committee in 2010, also advocated that the Committee itself could take decisions beyond the guidelines of the Convention, since they were the highest decision-making body. When interviewed, some of the key delegates attending the Brazilian session of the Committee agreed that their actions were central in creating this new arena of self-interest and overt politicisation. In their view, Brazil needed to secure the inscription of São Francisco Square in São Cristóvão on the List because of upcoming national elections.
Quantitative evidence of decision-making processes behind nominations for the World Heritage List supports such findings. Charts 1 and 2 both indicate a clear decline in the concordance rates between Advisory Bodies' recommendations and the Committee's final decisions on nomination of new properties to the World Heritage List. The evidence clearly shows that the recommendations of the Advisory Bodies have been increasingly questioned over the last decade. Notably, however, in 2013, we see changes following concerted efforts made in the Advisory Bodies recommendations to pre-empt and adapt to Committee dissatisfaction (as discussed below).
Some so-called 'neutral' nations like Estonia and Switzerland continue to argue for scientific and expert-based decision-making. In general, however, the Norwegian report suggests that decisions were taken behind the scenes rather than through public debate, including controversial territorial cases such as Jerusalem (Palestine and Israel, see De Cesari 2010; Dumper and Larkin 2012) and Preah Vihear (Cambodia and Thailand, see Hauser-Schäublin 2011; Williams 2011) . The Norwegian report also described the World Heritage in Danger List as increasingly ignoring expert advice from the IUCN in favour of political agreements between States Parties. This, they argued in the controversial case of extraction and export of forest products from the Madagascan site of Atsinanana, reduced the Convention to a type of environmental agreement. In the case of the Old City of Jerusalem, politics were at a premium: it was reported that the 2007 Action Plan was not supported by Israel, and Palestinian and Jordanian experts were excluded while illegal Israeli excavations continued. This situation has continued, unabated, to the present.
In 2010, an external auditor was tasked with assessing UNESCO's priority initiative, the 'Global Strategy for a Credible, Representative and Balanced World Heritage List' (UNESCO 2011a). This audit reinforced that Committee decisions increasingly diverge from the scientific opinions of the Advisory Bodies, contributing to a drift towards a more 'political' rather than 'heritage' approach to the Convention. Contrary to Article 9-3 of the Convention, sufficient representation is not being given to heritage experts within the national delegations and these are now largely political appointments. Moreover, amendments are being made to draft decisions even before a site is publicly presented and several delegations lodged official complaints (ICOMOS 2011, 6) .
UNESCO claims that the impact of the Convention has grown over time, inspiring greater involvement by governments, communities and individuals, universities, foundations and the private sector (Bandarin 2007 ). Yet inscription has become a political tool for nations to bolster their sovereign interests, using global patrimony as a pawn. Collective decision-making and the overarching responsibility for the conservation of sites, once the remit of national delegates with heritage expertise, have been replaced by excessive backstage lobbying by politicians (Hoggart 2011, 86; Cassel and Pashkevich 2013) and the bargaining power of nations with geopolitical alliances based on geography, religion, trade partnerships or anti-Western sentiment. Thus, the ideal of collective responsibility, both ethical and financial, once so central to the ideals of the Convention, is losing ground. Concern for local and indigenous community involvement is similarly being curtailed by powerful nation states (Logan 2013; Meskell 2013a) , despite UNESCO's own attempts to recognise indigenous expertise. Irrespective of scholarly debate about global heritage regimes, the statist desire to participate in the World Heritage arena continues to expand and therefore it is critical to examine the institutional political economies and capillary networks of power that underlie its processes on the ground.
We argue that state agendas have come to eclipse substantive discussions of the merits of site nominations during World Heritage Committee sessions as well as the attendant issues of community benefits, the participation of indigenous stakeholders or threats from mining and exploitation (Meskell , 2012 (Meskell , 2014 ; see also Askew 2010; Logan 2012). We suggest that the specificities of cultural and natural sites during their inscription, protection or even destruction have become largely irrelevant in substance, yet highly valued in state-to-state negotiations and transactions. Site specificity seems largely irrelevant to the States Parties, one could say that sites have lost their heritage value. 6 Instead they operate as transactional devices whereby cultural, and thus political, recognition both masks and enables a multifarious network of economic values (Di Giovine 2008; Salazar 2010b) .
With the growing dominance of strategic political alliances within the Committee of 21 states, the recommendations of the Advisory Bodies have been increasingly overturned (The Economist 2010; Jokilehto 2011 (Table 1) . It is worth noting that in only seven cases (highlighted in grey), the final Committee decision is lower than Advisory Bodies. The overall trend has been to push all final decisions toward the category of Inscription, so from Referral to Inscription, from Deferral to Referral or even Inscription and so on. 7 In almost every case, there is complete agreement between the Advisory Bodies and the Committee when the recommendation is to Inscribe a property.
When we examine decision-making over the past decade, more closely in Tables  2 and 3 , it is clear that during the later period the final decisions taken by the World Heritage Committee have been more divergent than in the previous one for nominations recommended by the Advisory Bodies for Referral, Deferral and non-Inscription. 8 This pattern is also evident with the concordance factor analysis above. From our interviews, we found that, given the negative trend observed and the tensions expressed, some members of the Advisory Bodies were themselves advised to present more favourable recommendations to the Committee in 2013 (see Chart 1 and 2 above).
Our work highlights that different bodies conceive of the problems in very different ways. Rao (2010) , now Director of the WHC, believes that there are systemic problems underlying the Committee's criticism of the Advisory Bodies. These can be glossed as failures in the World Heritage system to fully communicate and work with States Parties rather than simply evaluate them. Rao (2010, 164) considers the 'conflict of interest' argument as one of the greatest ironies of the World Heritage process and one that runs counter to the spirit of the Convention. Wealthy nations such as China can spend millions of dollars on nomination dossiers and thus expect that their investment will guarantee site inscription. More than US$5 million has been offered in preparatory assistance for some 360 nominations, and ultimately only 18.5% resulted in site inscription (Rao 2010, 165) . In his view, this vast expenditure of time, effort and money would be better channelled into a system of cooperation and mentoring. The Advisory Bodies have other suggestions. The IUCN, for example, insists that the credibility of the Convention is in jeopardy and that the WHC must provide consistent advice to the Committee on the observation of the Operational Guidelines and the Rules of Procedure (IUCN 2012). They suggest a greater role for the Advisory Bodies and other technical partners, better dialogue with States Parties, a focus on increased capacity at the site and state level and a raft of other measures. Outspoken Brazilian and Indian delegates during the 2013 meetings suggested changing the Operational Guidelines, bringing in independent evaluators, reducing the role of the Advisory Bodies, inscribing a larger quota of sites per country and so on. Ideally, some national delegates would see the World Heritage process as enabling and collaborative rather than competitive or rule-bound. Others like Estonia expressed their gratitude to the Advisory Bodies but Chart 2. Committee Membership and Site Inscription concordance. Note: The concordance factor for sites successfully nominated by State Parties on the World Heritage Committee (in black) was higher in the first years but has sharply declined recently. This also reflects on a diverging concordance factor between the two groups throughout the whole period (69% for countries on the Committee vs. 62% for those not represented).
remained concerned about political pressures from national governments and the dwindling heritage expertise within the delegations.
UNESCO and multilateralism
Given the developments outlined above, we might well ask if UNESCO diplomacy is faltering. Why have discussions about World Heritage become an arena for international tensions, political alliance building and challenges to global cooperation? Today, the politics around designating World Heritage are not dissimilar from those fraught international debates over nuclear disarmament or climate change. As noted above, the World Heritage Committee has become increasingly confrontational in recent years, as have the issues it now faces (The Economist 2010; UNESCO 2011b; Bertacchini and Saccone 2012; Brumann 2012) . Consider the 2011 UNESCO recognition of Palestine that precipitated the US financial withdrawal Meskell 2013b) or the Russian support of Syria despite calls for recognising Syrian sites as endangered (Meskell 2014) . Transgovernmental networks comprised of informal horizontal peer-to-peer interactions, including vote exchanges (Slaughter and Hale 2010) , have become the norm. However, across the UN, the state is not receding, rather it is changing the way sovereignty is exercised (Slaughter 2004) , leading to new forms of negotiation and governance. Disaggregation into their component government institutions effectively enables states to remain the central force in transnational governance and allows their officials to interact quasi-autonomously with their foreign counterparts (Slaughter 2004, 173) . Further, blurring the boundaries of domestic and international, pressures from private interests whether individuals, companies and NGOs are also becoming more common, especially regarding World Heritage properties.
In this section, we draw heavily from the work of Hale and Held (2011; Hale, Held, and Young 2013) , specifically their analysis of failing multilateral cooperation across the UN system. We build upon their work and ask how has this situation arisen in UNESCO, an organisation dedicated to peace building, tolerance and mutual understanding and international co-operation? It is a truism that we now face an ever more interconnected world and that our problems are more global and require solutions that traverse nation states and require them to work effectively together. Changes in technology, mobility and security have rendered domestic issues more global in scope. On the other hand, more complex issues even in the heritage realm, including conflict, development and climate change also generate multipolarity and fragmentation at the international level. The failures of multilateralism can be seen across the UN and the seemingly neutral and inconsequential sphere of World Heritage is not exempt. This is not simply the result of plodding negotiations, insufficient enforcement or the power imbalances between states that we are all familiar with in the intergovernmental sphere (Hale and Held 2011, 3) . Moreover, since institutions like UNESCO rely on the consent and participation of sovereign nations, their decisions often mirror the very lowest level of ambition to prevail. This lack of cooperation has serious consequences for sovereign nations, indigenous and minority communities as well as heritage places themselves.
After WW2, there was both growing institutionalisation and inter-reliance leading to what has been termed a cycle of 'self-reinforcing interdependence' (Hale, Held, and Young 2013, 4) . However, economic globalisation and the rise of new players, such as China, India and Brazil, have altered the ability for states to always effectively cooperate multilaterally. As the chart below demonstrates, regions like Europe and North America, and Asia and the Pacific score the highest concordance factor with the decisions of the Advisory Bodies, while the Arab States and Africa reveal the greatest divergence, and hence one could posit dissatisfaction. The victors of the post-war era and the architects of the UN system, the United States and Europe, have faced increasing difficulty in securing international agreements. They too have more often become the targets in forums like World Heritage, being regularly criticised for their historical dominance, elitism and outmoded priorities. Indeed, our own observations at World Heritage Committee meetings confirm that emerging nations want to increasingly set the agenda and control negotiations and have, in recent years, been extremely effective (Meskell , 2012 . This rising multipolarity increases the number of nations whose support must be garnered for cooperation, while the leverage of individual players such as the United States is concomitantly diminished.
Thomas Weiss argues that as new countries emerged to become economic forces in the global economy, they sought new forms of political influence and voice, including in the sphere of World Heritage. Throughout annual World Heritage Committee sessions, we have witnessed how emerging countries not only want a larger stake in agenda setting, they increasingly have the power and connections to secure it (Weiss 2012, 8) . With the end of colonialism in Africa for example, new regimes have become suspicious of Western power. As exemplified in Chart 3, in the World Heritage arena, we can see widespread regional dissatisfaction with the recommendations by ICOMOS and the IUCN decisions as opposed to the subsequent Committee decisions adopted over the past decade. Euro-American economic and institutional hegemony similarly came into question and their ability to coerce other states into a system of global order was subsequently reduced (Weiss 2012, 22) .
Hale and his colleagues (2013, 16) posit four reasons behind the current impasse. First, the number of international actors has vastly increased due to the success of emerging economies and with that has come diverse interests that require accommodation. The number of UN member states has grown from 51 in 1946 to 193 in 2013. Within the World Heritage Committee, one can witness the influence of the BRICS coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Claudi 2011; Meskell 2013b Meskell , 2014 . This group has a joint mission, set out in the Sanya Declaration, 9 and their uniform voting has been observed across the UN General Assembly (Ferdinand 2012) . These new powers have economies that are likely to rival and then surpass those of Japan, European countries and even the United States in the medium term according to Held. 'This rising multipolarity, combined with globalization ' Hale and Held (2011, 30-31) argue, 'is a powerful driver of interdependence, because it increases the number of powerful countries whose consent is required or cooperation, while simultaneously decreasing the leverage of any one country -even the most powerful -to compel a certain outcome'. This also means that the number of 'veto players' in global governance has increased.
Second, some policy-making processes inherited from the post-war era are now dysfunctional across the UN. Third, the easier issues of cooperation have been achieved, while deeper interdependence requires more sophisticated and powerful institutions that are themselves harder to create. Fourth, the proliferation of institutions has led to a fragmentation that can restrict rather than assist cooperation. In 1951, there were 123 intergovernmental organisations and 832 NGOs: in 2011, that number had dramatically risen to 7608 and 56,834, respectively (Hale, Held, and Young 2013, 45) . Such situations should not be surprising, however, as they are in essence endemic to the process of cooperation and in some ways reflect the successes of the UN system of inclusion and democracy.
These new modalities lead to cross-sectoral alliances and arrangements and such developments can be observed across international organisations such as the UN, or the World Bank and IMF. Several studies reveal that a developing country with a seat on the UN Security Council significantly enhances flows of aid from the US as well as credits from the IMF and World Bank: the driving effect being vote buying Vreeland 2009a, 2009b; Flues, Michaelowa, and Michaelowa 2010) . In terms of World Heritage, we question whether technical aspects like conservation or management are still paramount or whether member countries' special interests and their lobby groups have major influence.
Some of the most active and high-profile nations within the World Heritage arena from 2002 to 2013 in terms of site nominations are China (17), Iran (14), India and Italy (12), Germany (11), Mexico and Russian Federation (10) and France and Israel (9).
10 Already political at this stage, we can see in the case of Israel that despite the many nominations, proportionately few have been inscribed and we attribute this to a general failure in international support.
In our analysis related to the composition of the World Heritage Committee from 2003 to 2013, we have noticed that six nations served on the Committee for a total of seven years: India, Egypt, China, South Africa, Nigeria and the Russian Federation. Even though not numerically dominant on the Committee, BRICS countries have still dominated the debate over the past 11 years. Our analysis traces the number of verbal interventions made by States Parties in the plenary sessions for inscription of new properties to determine who is most vocal and influential in the World Heritage process. India (158) and Egypt (132) have the highest number of interventions, whereas China (87) and South Africa (78) ranked much lower. Even Brazil that has only served on the Committee for four years has a significant record of interventions (52) and ranks highly in comparison with other nations for the same period. Yet, as underscored in the Norwegian report regarding China, some nations employ a different system of lobbying such as 'corridor diplomacy' (Hoggart 2011, 86; Cassel and Pashkevich 2013) rather than formal debate during the Committee sessions. Significantly, China has the largest state presence with an average of 29 official delegates per meeting, while South Africa and the Russian Federation have an average of 20 per year. China had a 94% success rate for inscribing their properties. 11 Increasingly, successful nominations of State Parties are linked not just to the support of one or two neighbours, but also to a wide array of countries spanning the globe. Moreover, these interdependencies are no longer confined to a single group of countries (e.g. the West or industrialised democracies), but to a diverse range of economic regime types, religions and cultures (Hale and Held 2011, 30) . One example of this was with Palestine's first site inscription in 2012, the Church of the Nativity, which was vocally supported primarily by Christian nations including Russia and France, rather than strictly Middle Eastern delegations. Vocal support of Panama was offered in 2013 by Qatar and South Africa; both countries have no obvious regional or religious connections but have economic ties, and soon after trade agreements with those nations were announced in Panama (see Meskell 2014) . One intriguing case is the nomination of Bolgar in the Russian Federation, whose fate over the past decade or more offers a lens through which we acutely observe changing relations between the Advisory Bodies and the Committee, geopolitical pacting and dwindling concern for conservation and the principles of the Convention.
Gridlocked heritage: the Bolgar historical-architectural complex
The Bolgar Historical and Architectural Complex 12 is located in the Russian Federation Republic of Tatarstan. In 1999, its justification for World Heritage inscription included its importance as an archaeological site; its relevance for mediaeval Islamic architecture; as the first capital of the Golden Horde; and as a place of religion and pilgrimage for Islam. In 2000, ICOMOS expressed concern over the planning on a new industrial zone and the reconstruction of the collapsed Great Minaret. ICOMOS evaluators stated that the reconstruction 'would give an inaccurate impression of Bolgar: at no time in history did the minaret and the church stand side by side as functioning buildings'. The site was referred back to the State Party to clarify the issues. However, ICOMOS noted that given a satisfactory response, the property could be inscribed on the basis of criteria iii: unique testimony to the history and culture of the Tatars and to the empires that they founded, in particular, the empire of the Golden Horde. 13 In June 2000, during the 24th session of the Bureau in Paris, the ICOMOS evaluation was upheld and the property was Referred: but ICOMOS also recognised that the property fulfilled the requirements of Outstanding Universal Value.
14 Some months later, during the 24th World Heritage sessions, the Committee decided to move for a Deferral indicating that the nomination required more substantial revision than the term Referral implied. 15 The dossier was re-submitted in 2001 and addressed the concerns outright. Regarding the Great Minaret, Russia explained that the reconstruction 'was done in accordance with the ICOMOS Venice Charter with account for materials and based on the original documents' and that the reconstruction improved the visual perception of the complex. Russia denied that any industrial project (a nuclear power plant) was planned nearby and that this was simply a misunderstanding. Hence, at its 25th Extraordinary Session, the Bureau recommended the inscription of Bolgar on the basis of criterion iii. 16 However, during the 25th session of the Committee (2001), the Bureau recommendation was questioned. Specifically, the Committee disputed Russia's guarantees over the authenticity of the reconstruction. They requested further historical evidence of a nomadic empire and asked Russia to resubmit a revised nomination that might refocus the justification for inscription. 17 With the Committee's decision, there followed a hiatus of 10 years when the site's name was subsequently changed from the Bolgar Historical and Architectural Complex to Bolgar Historical and Archaeological Complex. This change also reflected a new justification: Bolgar was now a sacred place for all Russian Muslims, while the medieval architecture and archaeological features were downplayed. The site was recast as an exceptional testimony to the Bulgarian-Tatar civilisation during the tenth to fifteenth centuries AD.
18 This accords well with Russia's continued Soviet-style understanding and assimilation of ethnic minorities and President Putin's own interest in archaeology and origins (Shnirelman 2012) . Language, culture and heritage have all been deployed as soft power pawns to colonise, stabilise and integrate diverse separatist communities into the Russian Federation, just as Stalin did in the Soviet era (Shnirelman 1996) .
In 2012, ICOMOS recommended that Bolgar not be inscribed since 'significant changes to the historic substance in both consolidation and reconstruction measures as well as the construction of new developments had reduced the capacity of the site to provide credible testimony to the historic periods it is affiliated with'. 19 ICOMOS explained that those changes over the past decade had adversely affected the site's authenticity. Moreover, plans to develop the site for religious tourism would further compromise the Outstanding Universal Value. 20 During the World Heritage Committee meeting in St Petersburg, Russia flew delegates to the nearby city of Kazan where it had hosted UNESCO's Youth Day, 21 attempting to secure multilateral support for Bolgar's nomination.
In 2013, Bolgar again became a political flashpoint during the 37th World Heritage Committee sessions in Cambodia. For an entire week, 'corridor diplomacy' was intense while Russian delegates lobbied with other national representatives, in particular with the Palestinians. Private meetings sought to arrive at a consensual solution to stave off the ICOMOS recommendation of non-inscription, ultimately preventing any future proposals. But ICOMOS had neither the power nor intention to change a recommendation taken by its World Heritage panel. Russia countered that ICOMOS has made factual errors, and was misinformed about site preservation and reconstruction, and the site boundaries.
22 A working group chaired by Senegal failed to achieve a unanimous solution, deciding instead to refer the dossier back to the State Party until the 2014 Committee Session in Qatar. 23 During that time, Russia could take the necessary steps, with the support of ICOMOS, to consolidate the requirements for inscription on the basis of criterion iii and vi, 24 the association with events or living traditions.
Reframing Bolgar as a Muslim pilgrimage site strategically ensured the support of many Islamic nations on the World Heritage Committee. Arguing against the ICOMOS recommendation, Iraq described the site as 'cradle of Islam in Russia' and even considered it 'complementary to the pilgrimage to Mecca'. Qatar stated that the site's value was a 'symbol of peaceful coexistence' and a 'meeting place between the North, South, East and West'. The UAE said that the site provided 'testimony of interfaith dialogue'. Bolgar's religious dimension was further highlighted by Algeria, while Malaysia underlined its 'relevance for spirituality as a living tradition'. In terms of the conservation, Estonia countered that accepting Bolgar's extensive reconstruction would be tantamount to the Committee rebelling against its own principles instead of adhering to the highest conservation standards. Theirs was a solitary voice.
At the time of writing, Bolgar has just been inscribed as the 1002nd site on the World Heritage List at the Committee sessions in Doha, on 23 June 2014. While ICOMOS reiterated its previous concerns over site authenticity and integrity, they explained that their role during this advisory mission was to 'facilitate' the inscription. They claimed 'if criteria need(ed) to be found that could qualify authenticity', this could be justified on the basis of criteria ii and vi for Bolgar's role as a site of interchange between various cultures and its strong spiritual association as a site of Islamic pilgrimage. The German delegate called for an explanation as to why senior members of the World Heritage Center were present during the ICOMOS mission to Bolgar, hinting at possible preferential treatment for the site. One member of the Secretariat claimed his visit was not official but rather 'a coincidence'. ICOMOS responded more candidly that 'since the inscription was to be facilitated', its experts were there in an 'advisory role' rather than in an evaluation capacity, so there was no conflict of interest. In a surreal reversal of procedure, Bolgar becomes 'a clear demonstration of respect for the Convention and its procedures', according to some national delegates and 'example to emulate' for 'its persistence and hard work.' Conflicts of interest, political manoeuvring and undue pressure surround this site and it remains a salient example of the current crisis in World Heritage -conservation has been emptied out of the Convention and replaced by economic and political agendas.
Conclusions
Our analysis has focused upon the last step of the UNESCO World Heritage decision-making process, namely after the technical recommendations have been made. Our findings reveal that there is now more divergence between those technical recommendations by the Advisory Bodies and the final decisions adopted by the World Heritage Committee. However, this does not mean that political and economic influences were not salient in the past; they were simply less evident. One of the contributions of our work is to better understand how the divergent positions of the Advisory Bodies and the Committee have evolved. This, in turn, enables us to better understand the political and economic interests at stake for nation states.
The history of decisions surrounding Bolgar exemplifies the gridlock that the World Heritage arena increasingly faces. The authority of the Advisory Bodies has been eroded and there is less concordance with Committee decisions. Consensual, much less unanimous solutions are thus more difficult to achieve. States Parties are exerting increasing influence over voting with more overt strategies of influence, international pressure and soft power diplomacy . The substance of heritage and its protection matters less and less, even in conflict situations (Meskell 2014) , and can be manipulated for economic, political or religious advantage by politicians and ambassadors. Delegations are now largely comprised of political appointments rather than heritage experts. And the key international players have changed, with smaller, once marginal nations securing seats on the Committee and gaining greater influence so that multipolarity is de rigueur. The victors of the post-war global arena are all but invisible, which might signal greater inclusion and tolerance, but frequently serves the goals of emergent nations like the BRICS coaltion (Meskell 2013) . The old divide of 'the West and the Rest' seems to fall short of the complex machinations we witness today, built on an ever-shifting terrain of regional, religious, social, economic and political alliances. Finally, in this gridlocked system, decisions concerning the fate of World Heritage now mirror the very lowest level of ambition rather than aspiring to the highest principles of conservation or community involvement.
Since the end of the Second World War, the world community has sought to establish and maintain institutions that govern its common affairs. The arena of global heritage is no different. While such institutions take many forms, by far the most important have been formal international agreements through which countries bind themselves, under international law, to negotiated commitments. We suggest that the competing political and economic interests we witness over issues as broad as climate change or nuclear proliferation are no different from those of the 1972 World Heritage Convention for the nations of the world. Yet such institutions have their roots in a much earlier age and are now locked in dysfunctional decision-making procedures, while the proliferation of different organisations renders the institutional architecture ever more fragmented (Hale, Held, and Young 2013, 3) . Together, these procedures have blocked global cooperation within intergovernmental organisations like UNESCO.
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